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We analyse vertical integration when there is upstream competition and 
compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent 
(i.e., upstream monopoly). In so doing, we make two contributions to the 
modelling of strategic vertical integration. First, we base industry structure – 
namely, the ownership of assets – firmly within the property rights approach to 
firm boundaries. Second, we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a 
fully specified non-cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare 
outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly. Given this, we 
demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoffs of integrating 
parties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firms 
integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. We also 
consider the potential for integration to internalise competitive externalities in 
manner that cannot be achieved under non-integration. We demonstrate that ex 
post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly 
than when there is upstream competition. Our general conclusion is that the 
simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and 
reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced 
and, depending upon the strength of downstream competition (i.e., product 
differentiation), the opposite could easily be the case. Journal of Economic 
Literature Classification Number: L42 
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There are long-standing antitrust concerns about potential social detriment from 
vertical integration, centering on integration by an upstream monopoly into the 
downstream segment. The monopolist may restrict supply after integration and foreclose 
on downstream rivals, or it may appropriate more of the rents at the expense of 
downstream firms. Moreover, there is a general belief that improving competition in the 
bottleneck segment would alleviate these concerns.
1 
There are two ways that competition might serve to discourage socially harmful 
vertical integration. First, upstream competitors will respond to attempts by a firm to 
foreclose on rivals by expanding their supply to the downstream. Thus, a firm facing 
competition will not be able to use vertical integration to raise prices in the industry. 
Second, it is claimed that competition reduces any bargaining power conferred on the 
monopolist by integration and the threat of foreclosure.  
To date, there has been no comprehensive theoretical analysis of the role that 
competition plays on the incentives for vertical integration and its social desirability. This 
paper provides such an analysis. In so doing, our primary task is to provide a model 
capable of studying the pure effect of an increase in competition. Thus we need to 
consider an environment where competition does not otherwise change total resources, 
technical productivity in the industry or the nature of bargaining in an ad hoc manner. To 
this end, we consider an environment where there are two downstream and two upstream 
assets. Upstream competition is modeled as a situation where the two upstream assets are 
separately owned, whereas under upstream monopoly they are commonly owned.  
Our main modeling contribution, however, lies in the game we use to model 
bargaining between upstream and downstream firms over input supply. We consider an 
environment, common in the property rights approach to firm boundaries (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), where the manager of each asset has asset-specific 
skills, and integration decisions – i.e., the ownership of assets – are made prior to 
                                                 
1 See Williamson (1987) for a discussion of these presumptions.  
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bargaining over the supply of inputs. This set-up allows us to consider the bargaining 
effects of vertical integration in a similar manner to the standard property rights literature. 
In particular, in our environment, integration does not remove the potential for the 
manager of an acquired firm to accrue rents. This is true both for a firm integrating 
vertically but also for an upstream monopoly where one upstream asset is owned by the 
manager of the other. Thus, we can capture the full effects of integration on bargaining 
relations in the industry. Moreover, in so doing, we are able to investigate new issues in 
strategic vertical integration; namely, the potential differences between forward and 
backwards integration. 
Bargaining takes a non-cooperative form with each upstream-downstream pair 
negotiating sequentially over the quantity supplied and the non-linear price between 
them. Irrevocable breakdowns in negotiations between any upstream and downstream 
firm constitute a “material change in circumstances” as specified in many contracts, and 
thereby trigger renegotiations of any previously agreed upon supply contracts. Thus 
supply arrangements are non-binding in the sense considered by Stole and Zwiebel 
(1996) for employment contracts. Here, we interpret the non-binding nature of 
agreements as indicative of a difficulty in writing long-term contracts relative to 
decisions regarding firm structure. We demonstrate that the distribution of the surplus 
from this type of bargaining is similar to that arising from the Shapley value concept in 
cooperative game theory. At the same time, this type of bargaining leads naturally to 
some of the inefficiencies emphasized in the contracting externalities literature: an 
upstream supplier with more than one buyer downstream oversupplies the market, 
because they cannot commit not to impose negative externalities on one buyer by selling 
large quantities to the other buyer.
2 
We demonstrate that vertical integration has two potential effects. First, the 
bargaining position of all agents changes. Second, some contracting externalities are 
internalized. To demonstrate the first, we initially consider an environment where 
downstream assets are in different markets so that there are no competitive externalities 
                                                 
2 The seminal work on this comes from Hart and Tirole (1990) in terms of its relationship to vertical 
integration. However, McAfee and Schwartz (1994), O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and Segal (1999) provide 
comprehensive treatments of the contracting problem when there are externalities amongst firms. See Rey 
and Tirole (1997) for a survey.   
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between them (Section 3). There vertical integration changes only the distribution of 
bargaining power and not the surplus generated. We show that vertical integration can 
increase the sum of payoffs for the integrating parties because it improves their 
bargaining position in negotiations with independent firms; specifically, it eliminates the 
possibility of market structures that may be favourable to independents.  
Importantly, we demonstrate that there is a greater incentive for vertical 
integration under upstream competition than under monopoly. This is because the 
bargaining benefits come from the redistribution of rents from non-integrating parties; 
and in a monopoly, the non-integrating parties already have low rents. Thus, competition 
enhances rather than reduces the potential for purely strategic vertical integration. 
Moreover, we find that integration occurs from the more competitive segment into the 
less competitive segment: for example, forward integration is chosen over backward 
integration only when upstream firms are closer substitutes than downstream firms. 
When competitive externalities downstream are taken into account, there is an 
additional incentive for vertical integration: integration can internalize those externalities 
and lead to some degree of monopolization in the industry. The integrated upstream firm, 
when dealing with the non-integrated downstream firm, will internalize the effect of its 
supply on its own downstream firm. Vertical integration of an upstream monopolist leads 
to higher industry profits than are possible under upstream competition, raising the 
returns to integration under upstream monopoly relative to upstream competition and 
mitigating the returns identified earlier that were based purely on bargaining. Indeed, we 
demonstrate that in some situations, industry profits may fall (along with consumer 
surplus) as a result of vertical integration under upstream competition. 
In this environment, we identify product differentiation as a key parameter driving 
incentives to vertically integrate. In particular, we find that when product differentiation 
is low (high), backward integration is more (less) privately profitable than forward 
integration. Importantly, while the conventional concern about vertical integration is 
confirmed when downstream products are relatively homogeneous, the incentive for such 
integration will be higher from upstream competition than upstream monopoly if 
products are relatively differentiated. Both these results suggest that the conventional 
approach of examining the market power of the acquiring firm will not necessarily allow  
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one to draw a conclusion as to whether vertical integration is anti-competitive or not. 
The paper that is closest to our own is that of Hart and Tirole (1990) – hereafter, 
HT. That paper is the first to identify the bargaining and monopolization effects that arise 
from vertical integration.
3 While their paper identifies these using three separate variants 
– each with extreme assumptions regarding downstream demand and upstream costs – 
our model nests all of those variants within a single model that allows for more general 
downstream and upstream environments; in particular, we allow for downstream product 
differentiation that is identified as an important driver of incentives for integration.
4 Thus, 
one contribution of our paper is to demonstrate the robustness of HT’s results.
5 
Nonetheless, we identify subtle differences between our conclusions and theirs 
throughout. For instance, as in HT, we demonstrate that in some cases vertical integration 
may lead to a situation where there is foreclosure in input supply to the non-integrated 
downstream firm. However, in our model, this does not necessarily imply there is 
foreclosure in payments to that firm, as the integrated firm is interested in preserving 
supply to that firm as an option if bargaining with its internal manager were to break 
down. 
Significantly, however, HT’s model is not equipped to properly examine the 
questions that motivate us here. First, they assume that upstream and downstream firms 
simply share the surplus arising from a negotiation according to a fixed parameter, rather 
than model the drivers of bargaining power—in particular, the asset-specific skills that 
confer bargaining power in the property rights literature.
6 Consequently, there is no 
                                                 
3 Bolton and Whinston (1993) also identify a bargaining effect from vertical integration. Their model, 
however, does not have downstream firms directly competing, focusing instead of the impact of bargaining 
on investment incentives. Their analysis is complementary with that here although, like HT, it is formulated 
in a special manner to remove any distinction between forward and backward integration. 
4 A recent paper by Chemla (2002) also nests a bargaining and monopolization effect. He demonstrates that 
an upstream monopolist may expend resources to encourage entry by downstream firms so as to limit their 
bargaining power. He demonstrates that vertical integration will have the dual effect of reducing the 
monopolist’s need to expend those resources and also lead to higher industry profits. de Fontenay and Gans 
(1999) similarly demonstrate that vertical integration can lead to reduced downstream entry and higher 
industry profits, but do so using a bargaining framework similar to that considered in this paper, although 
without an incomplete-contracts perspective on the effect of integration. The current paper does not study 
the effect of changes in bargaining power the entry decisions of firms, but focuses its attention on the effect 
of upstream competition. 
5 Many of HT’s results rely on integration precipitating exit of an upstream or downstream firm. We 
demonstrate similar bargaining and monopolization effects to HT but without the use of the exit device that 
drove many of their results. 
6 Other papers in the literature avoid the need to model the drivers of bargaining power by assuming that  
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distinction between forward and backward integration. In contrast, in our model, the 
bargaining position of each firm is driven by their roles in possible market structures that 
arise following breakdowns in individual negotiations. As forward and backwards 
integration have different implications as to what market structures are feasible, there will 
be a difference in the incentives and impact of each. 
Second, their analysis of the impact of upstream competition is limited to an 
analysis of the efficiency of the weaker upstream firm. That is, they consider what 
happens to the incentives to vertically integrate as the weaker upstream firm becomes 
more efficient, which confounds the effect of market power and the effect of superior 
productivity. Our analysis of the impact of upstream competition models competition as 
the horizontal integration of both upstream assets. And as such, it explicitly considers the 
impact of vertical integration on internal arrangements within the upstream monopoly. 
In terms of its bargaining game, the paper has several antecedents. Grossman and 
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) were the first to focus on Shapley values as 
likely outcomes of the bargaining game between firms. Variants of the bargaining game 
developed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) have been applied to bargaining between firms 
over variable quantities by de Fontenay and Gans (1999), Inderst and Wey (2002) and 
Björnerstedt and Stennek (2001).
7 Note that contracting externalities are ruled out in all 
of the above game structures: the first rules it out axiomatically, while the latter two 
consider environments in which downstream players impose no externalities on each 
other. Here instead we allow sequential contracting in an environment in which 
downstream players are in the same market, leading to contract externalities as explored 
elsewhere in the literature on vertical integration. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up our basic model 
and, in particular, the non-cooperative bargaining game that is capable of assessing the 
impact of upstream competition on the incentives for vertical integration. Sections 3 and 
4 then provide analyses of the no externalities and competitive externalities cases when 
one vertical merger is possible. Section 5 then considers incentives for a second merger 
                                                                                                                                                 
either upstream or downstream firms have all of the bargaining power (Rey and Tirole, 1997; Chemla, 
2002). This is also a common assumption in the contracting with externalities literature (McAfee and 
Schwartz, 1994; and Segal, 1999). 
7 Only de Fontenay and Gans examine vertical integration; Inderst and Wey examine horizontal mergers.   
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and the question of whether bandwagoning can occur (that is, whether a first merger can 
increase the incentives for a second one). A final section concludes. 
2  Model Set-Up 
We examine an industry that has two upstream and two downstream assets. The 
upstream assets produce inputs that are used by downstream assets to make final goods. 
Inputs from at least one upstream asset are necessary for valuable production 
downstream. In addition, associated with each asset is a manager endowed with asset-
specific human capital that is in turn necessary to generate valuable goods and services 
from that asset.
8 We denote the respective managers of upstream firms A and B by UA and 
UB, and downstream managers by D1 and D2. Integration changes the ownership of these 
assets; however, the manager associated with an asset will not change, as each remains 
necessary for its use. 
An upstream asset, Uj, can produce input quantities  1j q  and  2 j q  for D1 and D2, 
respectively. Its costs are given by  12 (, ) jjj cq q , assumed to be quasi-convex in  12 (, ) jj qq . 
Using input quantities,  iA q  and  iB q  from UA and UB, respectively, Di makes a 
downstream profit (gross of payments to upstream suppliers) of  ( , , , ) ii Ai B i A i B qqq q π −−  
where -i denotes the index of i’s potential downstream rival. We assume that  (.) i π  is 
concave in ( , ) iA iB qq, non-increasing in ( , ) iA iB qq −− .  
Finally, it will often be convenient to express outcomes in terms of industry 
profits that can be generated for various supply possibilities. Let 
11
22
12 , 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2
,
( ) m a x (,,,) (,,,) (,) (,)
AB
AB
A Bq q A B A B A B A B A A A B B B
qq
D D U U qqqq qqqq c qq c qq ππ Π≡ + − −  
be maximized industry profits when both upstream assets can potentially provide inputs 
that can be used by both downstream assets. Industry profits for other supply possibilities 
are similarly defined. For example, 
 
11 1, 1 1 1 1 1 ( ) max ( , ,0,0) ( ,0) ( ,0)
AB A B q q AB AA BB DU U q q c q c q π Π≡ − − 
                                                 




1 11 11 ( ) max ( ,0,0,0) ( ,0)
A Aq A A A DU q c q π Π≡ −  
It is possible that a particular market structure may involve a ‘partitioned’ set of supply 
arrangements. For instance, D1 may only negotiate with UA and D2 may only negotiate 
with UB. In this situation, we will use the notation  
 
1 12 1 1 2 1 ( , ) max ( ,0,0, ) ( ,0)
A AB q A B A A DU DU q q c q π Π≡ −  
 
2 21 2 2 1 2 (,) m a x( 0 , , , 0 ) ( 0 , )
B BA q B A BB DU DU q q c q π Π≡ −  
to denote the (equilibrium) profits to each buyer/supplier pair, respectively. The Le 
Châtelier principle implies that maximized industry profits are higher whenever an 
additional asset and its associated manager are used. For example, 
12 2 () ( ) AA DDU DU Π≥ Π  and  12 12 () ( ) AB A DDUU DDU Π≥ Π .  
2.1  Timeline 
The timeline for our model is as follows: 
STAGE 0 (Asset Allocation): Ownership of assets is determined among all four 
managers. 
STAGE 1 (Bargaining): Productivity parameters are revealed and bargaining over 
input supply terms takes place. 
STAGE 2 (Production): Production takes place and payoffs are realized. 
 
The asset allocation process is not modeled with a fully specified endogenous process.
9 
Instead, we focus on more limited, partial incentives, including whether integration is 
jointly profitable for the merging parties.
10 The stage that requires further elaboration is 
the bargaining stage and we turn now to discuss that in detail. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1993 and Hart, 1995).  
9 Some papers do consider such issues; including Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990). However, the 
externalities involved in asset allocation make a complete modeling of this process work fit for a separate 
paper. For an exploration of such issues see Gans (2001). 
10 We do not explicitly model any efficiency cost to integration. This could involve a straight resource costs 
(as in HT) or alternatively investment incentive effects (as in Hart and Moore, 1990; Bolton and Whinston, 
1993). For the remainder of this paper, we simply compare the profitability of integration under different 
market structures, supposing that the most profitable opportunities of integration are the least likely to be 
outweighed by the cost of lost resources or investment.  
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2.2  Bargaining 
Upstream and downstream firms can reach supply agreements specifying non-
linear prices. Without loss of generality, we examine bargaining over supply from Uj to 
Di specifying a quantity, qij, and lump-sum transfer,  ij p %  paid by i to j. No other contracts, 
in particular no contingent contracts, can be written. When bargaining takes place 
internally, quantity is not relevant and the focus of negotiations is over the size of any 
transfer payment,  ij t %
 paid by j to manager i for i’s participation in the production process. 
Our bargaining game is basically an extension of the wage bargaining model of 
Stole and Zwiebel (1996)—hereafter SZ – to the case of vertical supply agreements. 
Bargaining is pairwise, vertical (occurring between managers of individual upstream and 
downstream assets), and sequential (only one pair of agents bargain at a time). The order 
in which pairs bargain in every situation, or the probability of each order, is common 
knowledge. Each pair of negotiators make sequential offers to each other until they reach 
an agreement, and after an offer is rejected there is an infinitesimally small probability of 
an irrevocable breakdown in negotiations. Binmore Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) 
have proven that a pair bargaining in this fashion will agree on the Nash bargaining 
solution. Therefore, each pair splits the surplus resulting from an agreement relative to 
their expected payoffs in any renegotiation subgame that might be triggered by a 
disagreement. 
Each pair signs a contract, but the contract is void if any subsequent bargain 
breaks down. The idea is that any breakdown in negotiations would radically change the 
supply configuration, allowing firms to invoke a clause in their contract calling for 
complete renegotiation after a “material change in circumstances.” In other words, we are 
envisaging a short-run price formation process rather than negotiations over long-term 
supply contracts. This is an appropriate structure in environments in which price 
contracts are renegotiated more frequently than the market structure changes. 
The key difference between our environment and SZ’s is that input supply 
quantities are potentially variable and there is competition on both sides of the market. 
Their model had a single firm bargaining with many workers, each of whom supplied an 
indivisible unit of labor. While, as we demonstrate below, SZ’s broad outcomes translate  
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naturally to an environment without externalities (specifically, they provide a non-
cooperative foundation for the Shapley value), the presence of externalities provides 
some complications that we outline in more detail below. 
Figure 1 presents a possible sequence of bargaining negotiations for the baseline 
case of non-integration. Each box represents a bargaining session between a pair which 
can result in agreement (A) or breakdown (B).  (.) Γ  denotes the subgame which takes 
place over the indicated sequence of pairs. Thus,  1212 (, ,, ) ABBA DU DU DU DU Γ  indicates a 
sequence of negotiations beginning with D1-UA, followed by D2-UB, D1-UB and D2-UA, 
respectively. If there is a breakdown in negotiations between D2 and UB in this sequence, 
the renegotiation subgame,  112 (,, ) AB A DU DU DU Γ , is triggered. Thus, unless bargaining is 
between the only remaining pair, breakdowns trigger a sequence of renegotiations 
between all remaining pairs in the original order.
11 Consequently, when agents bargain 
together, they take as their disagreement payoff their expected payoff from this 
renegotiation game. 
Because we assume that no contingent contracts can be written, subgame 
perfection implies that all players take disagreement payoffs as given in their current 
negotiations. Because a breakdown in negotiations is irrevocable, after a breakdown the 
game will never return to the current “node of the game,” the set of negotiations currently 
underway; therefore agents cannot credibly choose a post-breakdown strategy that will 
improve their payoff in the current negotiations. Instead, after a breakdown they will 
follow the strategy that maximizes payoffs in post-breakdown negotiations.  
When upstream and downstream firms are integrated – that is, their assets have a 
common owner – the owner negotiates over the transfer payment with the manager of 
each integrated asset, and the suppliers/supplies of an integrated asset negotiate with the 
owner. Again, the order of negotiations is common knowledge. 
A final critical point to note is that the bargaining game is one of incomplete 
information. In particular, agents are not aware of prices and quantities agreed upon in 
other negotiations that they did not participate in. All they are aware of is whether an 
agreement or breakdown has occurred. Similarly, SZ implicitly assumed that prices were 
                                                 
11 As will be demonstrated below, as in SZ, the original order does not matter for surplus generated or 
payoffs received. As such, it is arbitrary.  
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unobservable, so that prices were not a function of the bargaining order, and that agents 
held  passive beliefs regarding the prices agreed upon in earlier negotiations. Under 
passive beliefs, an agent’s beliefs about the outcomes of other negotiations are not 
revised by an unexpected price offer. In the vertical contracting literature, a similar 
assumption is made regarding quantities agreed upon by other negotiating pairs.
12 We 
adopt the passive beliefs assumption here with respect to both prices and quantities. The 
result is SZ prices, but inefficient quantities in the presence externalities. 
3  Bargaining and Integration with No Externalities 
In this section, we assume that there are no competitive externalities 
downstream.
13 That is, for each Di, ( , , , ) ( , ,0,0) i iA iB iA iB i iA iB qqq q qq π π −− =  for 
all( , ) iA iB qq −− . This may arise if downstream firms sell distinct products using a similar 
set of inputs, sell products in different geographical markets, or sell highly differentiated 
products.
14 As will be demonstrated, this case allows us to isolate the impact of vertical 
integration on each agent’s bargaining position – holding efficiency considerations as 
fixed – and provide a basis for comparing the effects of upstream competition in this 
regard.  
3.1  Non-Integration 
To build intuition, we first examine the case of non-integration when there is 
upstream competition. Under non-integration, all four assets are separately owned by 
their respective managers, who can potentially negotiate with any vertically related 
manager. As we will see, this is not the case under integration. 
Given the assumption of passive beliefs we can solve for the equilibrium payoffs 
                                                 
12 See McAfee and Schwartz (1994) for a detailed discussion. 
13 To clarify, there are still externalities between negotiations in that an agreement by one pair impacts upon 
upstream costs faced in another. However, we demonstrate that such externalities are internalized. 
14 This case has been a common focus of the literature on strategic vertical integration (Bolton and 
Whinston, 1993), the role of exclusive contracts (see, for example, Segal and Whinston, 2000) as well as 
competition in buyer-seller networks (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Kranton and Minehart, 2001). In work 
contemporary with the present paper, Inderst and Wey (2002) and Bjornerstedt and Stennek (2001) also  
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of each agent. Moreover, we can demonstrate that the outcome is efficient in that industry 
profits are maximized. 
Proposition 1. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs, 
1212 (,,, ) AA BB q q q q  are such that  1 11 2 22 12 12 (,) (, ) (, ) (, ) AB AB AA A BB B qq qq c qq c qq π π + −− is 
maximized. Each agent receives their payoff as given in Table 1. 
 
The proof is in the appendix. Notice that this result is independent of the precise ordering 
of pairs in sequential negotiations. 
The intuition for efficiency is subtle, given the interactions between the 
negotiations of each pair of agents. As depicted in Figure 2(a), under non-integration, 
there are potentially four pairs of negotiations. Each negotiation involves Nash 
bargaining where the pair chooses their respective supply quantity to maximize their 
bilateral payoff. For example, UA and D1 would choose  11 (,) AA p q %  to maximize: 
  () ( ) 11 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 (,) (, ) AB A B A A A AA A A qq p p p p c qq π −−− Φ +− − Φ %% %%  (1) 
where  ij Φ  and  ji Φ  represent the payoffs Di and Uj expect to receive in the renegotiation 
subgame triggered by a breakdown in their negotiations; by subgame perfection, these are 
taken as given. The remaining pricing terms either form the subject of a previous 
agreement earlier in the bargaining sequence (in which case their terms are given by the 
assumption of passive beliefs) or anticipate the negotiations of pairs further in the 
sequence. In that case, we can demonstrate that when anticipated outcomes are 
substituted into (1), the only term involving  1A q , taking into account the envelope 
theorem, is a linear function of  11 1 1 2 (,) (, ) AB AA A qq c qq π − . Thus,  1A q  is always chosen to 
maximize industry profits. 
In terms of distribution, the equilibrium payoffs in Table 1 represent the Shapley 
values of each respective agent given the allocation of assets among them. This mirrors 
the finding of SZ.
15 While other analyses of bilateral oligopoly have derived Shapley 
value outcomes in their relevant bargaining game ours differs in two respects. First, it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
provide an analysis of the no competitive externalities case under conditions of bilateral oligopoly. 
15 A similar type of result drives Stole and Zwiebel (1998). Their paper considers the impact of a horizontal 
merger amongst non-competing firms on intra-firm bargaining with workers. A horizontal merger means 
that workers connected previously to one another through two firms, will be connected directly to the 
merged entity. Stole and Zwiebel (1998) show that this may improve or harm their bargaining position 
depending upon the nature of cost savings from the merger.  
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based on sequential rather than simultaneous bargaining. Second, given this, we do not 
require supply agreements to specify pricing arrangements that would arise for every 
industry configuration. For example, Inderst and Wey (2002) require price and quantity 
agreements to be arrived at for every possible series of breakdowns that may emerge. In 
contrast, we do not allow negotiating agents to commit to supply arrangements 
contingent on the exit or severing of any supply relationship in the industry. 
3.2  Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration involves a change in asset ownership between an upstream 
and a downstream manager. We will focus here on vertical integration between UA and 
D1. This may involve forward integration (FI) whereby UA acquires D1’s assets or 
backward integration (BI) where UA’s assets are acquired by D1.
16 In each case, as in the 
property rights literature, the acquirer becomes the residual claimant to the earnings of an 
asset and has residual control rights as to what it is used for (Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990). However, each manager continues to be essential for the 
productive use of the asset. 
To illustrate what changes in ownership mean in the present context, suppose UA 
integrates forward by purchasing D1’s assets. The manager of the acquired D1 receives a 
transfer payment,  1A t% , while the profits from its asset,  11 1 1 1 (,) AB A B qq t p π − − % % , accrue to the 
new owner, UA. Importantly, as depicted in Figure 2(b), UA rather than D1 negotiates a 
supply agreement with UB for the supply of inputs to D1. This is because the residual 
control rights of the downstream asset have been transferred to UA. Thus, in the event of a 
breakdown in negotiation between UA and the manager of D1 or UA and UB, no supply 
will occur between UB and D1.  
What this means is that a breakdown between UA and the manager of D1 has a 
deeper impact upon UB and D2. While, under non-integration, such a breakdown would 
still mean that D1 could continue to operate receive supply from UB, under FI, this would 
no longer occur. In this case, UB would be left with D2 as its sole source of demand. FI 
                                                 
16 There is a third option characterized by some form of joint ownership. As there is an issue with regard to 
how that form of ownership might operate in this setting (see Bolton and Whinston, 1993), we do not 
consider it here.  
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thus eliminates UB being the only supplier of D1; thereby, weakening its bargaining 
power. For the same reason, FI improves the bargaining position of D2 as it increases the 
chances it will not have to compete with D1 for UB’s input. 
Nonetheless, in this environment, it can be demonstrated – along the same lines as 
the proof of Proposition 1 – that integration (BI or FI) will only impact upon the 
distribution of surplus between agents and not on the overall surplus generated. As in 
non-integration, this occurs because, under passive beliefs, each negotiating pair chooses 
its respective quantity in a way that does not impact on the pricing and quantity terms of 
other negotiations. Thus, the supply quantities chosen continue to maximize industry 
profits. 
Each agent’s payoffs change, however. Those payoffs are contained in Table 1. 
The critical feature to note about the effects of integration is that it rules out the 
participation of an asset’s manager from a coalition that does not include the owner. 
When UA owns D1 (that is, forward integration FI), the payoff  12 () B DDU Π  becomes 
2 () B DU Π , and the payoff  1 () B DU Π  becomes  () 0 B U Π = . When D1 owns UA (that is, 
backward integration BI), the payoff  2 () AB DU U Π  becomes  2 () B DU Π , and the payoff 
2 () A DU Π  becomes  2 ()0 D Π= . In each case, integration diminishes the bargaining 
position of one or both of the non-integrated firms and, as is depicted in the last two rows 
of Table 1, this raises UA and D1’s joint payoff from integration over non-integration by 
()
1
12 2 6 () ( ) BB DDU DU Π− Π  for FI and  ( )
1
22 6 () ( ) AB B DUU DU Π− Π  for BI.  
Comparing these two changes in payoff, notice that FI will be chosen over BI if 
and only if  12 2 () () BA B DDU DUU Π> Π. That is, FI is favoured as an instrument for 
improving joint bargaining power precisely when upstream firms are closer substitutes 
than downstream firms.
17 In other words, the acquiring firm comes from the more 
competitive vertical segment. This is precisely because integration eliminates an option 
for the acquirer’s competitor, an option that is valuable precisely because firms in the 
other vertical segment are not close substitutes (and therefore that segment is less 
competitive). For example, forward integration means that UB loses an option to supply  
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both downstream firms and this loss is costly when supplying both is relatively valuable. 
Consequently, the non-integrating firm that suffers the greatest harm from integration is 
the firm that is in the same segment as the acquiring firm (i.e., D2 under BI and UB under 
FI). 
Importantly, our results here generalise HT’s ‘scarce needs’ and ‘scarce supplies’ 
motives for vertical integration, by allowing for upstream costs to lie between the 
extremes of constant and L-shaped marginal costs. To see this, observe that when 
upstream marginal costs are constant and symmetric (that is, there are ‘scarce needs’ as 
industry supply is perfectly elastic), D1 and UA have no incentive for BI but a positive 
incentive for FI. In this case, D2’s payoff is unchanged and rents shift entirely from UB. In 
contrast, when upstream firms are capacity constrained and downstream firms are 
perfectly substitutable
18 (that is, there are ‘scarce supplies’), there is no incentive for FI 
but a positive incentive for BI. In that case, it is UB’s payoff that is unchanged by 
integration with the impact being borne entirely by D2. This accords with the general 
findings of HT.
19 However, we have derived these motives for vertical integration in a 
model where bargaining position is determined by the characteristics of possible 
breakdown market structures rather than an exogenous parameter. We demonstrate below 
that these motives are preserved when competitive externalities are considered.  
3.3  Upstream Monopoly 
As the focus of this paper is the change in the effect of vertical integration as 
upstream competition is introduced, we need to take care in specifying the upstream 
monopoly case.
20 In particular, we require the set of productive assets in the industry to 
be the same between the two cases as well as the characteristics of any human capital. 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 As  22 () ( ) AB j D UU D U Π→ Π  
18 In the no externalities case, this would arise if  /
ii j q π ∂ ∂  were constant for any quantity smaller than total 
upstream capacity. In HT, they assume that downstream outputs are perfect substitutes that also make those 
firms perfect substitutes. We consider this case in Section 4 below. 
19 Strictly speaking, while HT find that only D2 is harmed under ‘scarce supplies,’ in their ‘scarce needs’ 
model both non-integrated firms were harmed by integration. In our model, when upstream costs lie 
between these two extremes, we also find the both D2 and UB are harmed by integration. 
20 All of the results regarding vertical integration in this sub-section would similarly hold if we had a 
downstream monopsony rather than upstream monopoly. There would, however, be a difference in results  
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This means that we cannot simply take the two upstream assets and combine them under 
a single owner, as one of the assets will be managed by an individual with important 
human capital. As with vertical integration, that agent cannot be replaced and so will 
have some bargaining power in negotiations with the owner of upstream assets. 
The only difference between the outcomes under upstream monopoly as 
compared with upstream competition is in the distribution of the surplus between agents. 
Industry profits are maximized under the same logic as Proposition 1 and these profits are 
the same as under upstream competition, as the characteristics of resources in the industry 
are unchanged. In contrast, the payoffs of individual agents – listed in Table 1 – are 
different under upstream monopoly. 
The negotiating relationships for upstream monopoly are depicted in Figure 3(a). 
In comparison with the upstream competition case, there are only three relevant 
negotiations as there is only a single firm negotiating the supply of inputs to downstream 
firms. What this means is that if negotiations between the upstream monopolist (chosen 
to be UA) and a downstream firm break down, the downstream firm exits the industry. 
As before, we consider vertical integration between UA and D1. The changed 
bargaining relationships are depicted in Figures 3(b) and 3(c) for the cases of forward and 
backwards integration, respectively. Notice that, under forward integration, the change in 
residual control rights implies no change in the bargaining relationships. This means that 
forward integration will yield exactly the same payoffs as non-integration. 
In contrast, the changes in bargaining relationships under backwards integration 
are quite extensive (see Figure 3(c)). In this situation, D1 purchases UA’s assets. This 
makes D1 the owner of its assets and those of UA and UB. It will negotiate with both of 
those managers. Hence, backwards integration allows some market structures to be 
possible relative to the non-integration case. In particular, it is now possible for D1 to rely 
solely on supply from UB, because UB’s manager can still supply D1 if negotiations break 
down between D1 and UA’s manager. The implication is that BI may improve UB’s 
bargaining position.
21  
Backward integration is preferred to the status quo — or, equivalently, FI — if 
                                                                                                                                                 
when we include competitive externalities downstream. 
21 For example, when UA and UB are perfect substitutes (i.e., symmetric with linear costs), UB obtains no  
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21 2 () () AB B DU U DDU Π> Π ; this is the same condition as under upstream competition. In 
other words, BI is preferable if upstream assets are relatively less substitutable than 
downstream assets. Otherwise, BI may not be privately desirable as it improves the 
bargaining power of UB whose productive role is otherwise similar to UA. Thus, as in the 
upstream competition case, the acquiring firm comes from the segment that is relatively 
competitive, and not the monopoly segment as is the presumption of conventional 
wisdom. 
3.4  Comparison of Upstream Competition and Upstream Monopoly 
We are now in a position to compare the incentives for vertical integration in 
upstream monopoly with those for upstream competition, based on pure bargaining 
effects. Recall that the payoff to FI relative to BI is determined by the same condition in 
upstream monopoly and upstream competition; so we can look at FI and BI in turn, using 
the results in Table 1.  
For FI, the comparison is clear: there is no incentive for FI under upstream 
monopoly, but a positive incentive for FI under upstream competition. FI confers 
additional market power on the upstream firm, by ruling out options for the other 
upstream firm; but under upstream monopoly, this has already been achieved. 
For BI, it is easy to see that it too will improve the joint payoff to UA and D1 by 
more under upstream competition than under upstream monopoly, as 
12 2 () ( ) BB DDU DU Π≥ Π . The role of BI is to eliminate the possibility of a D2 monopsony 
facing the upstream firms. Under upstream competition, BI only increases the chance of a 
bilateral monopoly between UB and D2, whereas under upstream monopoly the possibility 
of a UB monopoly is reintroduced. 
Thus, from a pure bargaining perspective, integration has a higher private return 
under upstream competition than from upstream monopoly. The reason for this is that the 
benefits of integration flow from harming agents outside of the proposed merger, thereby 
redistributing rents in favour of the insiders. Under upstream monopoly, outsiders either 
do not have their bargaining position change, or in some cases can potentially improve 
                                                                                                                                                 
rents under non-integration and positive rents under backwards integration.  
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their negotiating relationships with insiders. For upstream competition, integration 
always removes possible market structures that may have been of benefit to outsiders. 
Hence, the incentive for integration is stronger under upstream competition. If vertical 
integration involved a fixed cost (in terms of foregone investment, or transactions costs), 
integration would be more likely under upstream competition.
22 
4  Competitive Externalities 
The previous section demonstrates that incentives for strategic vertical integration 
can be higher under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. In the no 
externalities case, however, total surplus is unchanged following integration; industry 
profits are always maximized. However, integration altered the distribution of surplus in 
ways that were different, depending up the degree of upstream competition. When there 
are competitive externalities, the distributional (or bargaining) consequences of vertical 
integration are largely preserved. What differs is the level of total profits and therefore, 
integration has welfare consequences. As we demonstrate in this section, vertical 
integration can lead to higher downstream prices and increased deadweight losses, as in 
the contracting externalities literature. Critically, however, the industry profits generated 
by vertical integration differ between upstream competition and monopoly. In this 
section, we explore how the presence of upstream competition impacts upon the extent 
any welfare losses from integration. 
4.1  Total Surplus 
The contracting externalities literature typically considers a monopolist selling to 
downstream firms producing identical goods.
23 The monopolist makes take-it-or-leave-it 
offers to each firm in turn. If it were to sell the profit-maximizing quantity to the first, it 
would have an incentive to “secretly discount” (i.e., sell more than the profit-maximizing 
                                                 
22 Given that the payoffs of at least one non-integrated firm is being reduced by integration, there is also a 
possibility that integration may induce exit. In this case, there will be a direct welfare consequence of 
integration. This is the primary focus of HT; however, here we have specified a model and assumed that 
exit does not occur. That extension of the present model is left for future work.  
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quantity, at a discount) for other downstream firms, as those later offers would not 
internalize any externality imposed on contracts already signed. For this reason, firms 
will not accept a contract consistent with industry profit maximization. If prices and 
quantities are unobservable, and if agents hold passive beliefs, implying that they do not 
revise their beliefs about prices and quantities in other contracts when they observe 
behavior that is off the equilibrium path, the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium is for the 
monopolist to offer Cournot quantities to all firms. In other words, each negotiating pair 
maximizes their profits, taking the negotiated quantity in the other agreement as given.  
A similar set of outcomes arises in our bargaining environment. Bilateral Nash 
bargaining implies that each  ij q  is chosen to maximize  (.) (.) ij c π − , taking as given 
quantities chosen in other negotiations (by passive beliefs). When there were no 
competitive externalities, this choice did not impact upon the outcome of other 
negotiations; therefore each choice maximized industry profits. Similarly, in market 
structures where only one downstream firm is present, industry profits will still be 
maximized, as there are no competitive externalities. However, total industry profits will 
not be maximized overall when both downstream firms are present, as each negotiation 
imposes externalities on others. Let  ˆ (.) Π  represent equilibrium industry profits in that 
case. The following proposition summarises the equilibrium outcome: 
Proposition 2. There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs, under 
non-integration, regardless of whether there is upstream competition or monopoly, in 
which  12 ˆ () AB DDUU Π ,  12 ˆ () A DDU Π  and  12 ˆ () B DDU Π  are at their Cournot duopoly levels 
when upstream inputs are supplied at a price equal to industry upstream marginal cost. 
For all other structures,  ˆ (.) (.) Π= Π. 
 
As we do not rule out quantity commitments, our model yields the same conclusion 
reached in the contracting externalities literature, that under passive beliefs, Cournot 
outcomes will result. What is interesting here is that this is achieved despite the fact that 
there are two upstream firms, yielding the same outcome (most notably productive 
efficiency)
24 as if there were a single upstream firm. Interestingly, this implies that an 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 See HT, Rey and Tirole (1997), O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994). 
24 That is, suppose, as do HT, that both upstream firms have constant marginal costs but that UB’s is higher 
than  UA’s. In this case, under upstream monopoly, UA would never choose to supply using the other 
upstream asset. And under upstream competition, the Cournot equilibrium would involve supply purely  
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upstream merger does not change retail prices and welfare downstream in this setting.
25 
Because there is no negotiation involving residual claimants on the returns of both 
downstream assets, there is no negotiation where the impact of a supply choice on both 
firms is considered. Instead, in each negotiation the quantity of one downstream firm is 
chosen holding that of the other constant – yielding a Cournot equilibrium. 
EXAMPLE:  Suppose that both downstream firms face linear demand, 
1( ) ( ) ii A i Bi A i B pq qq q γ −− =− + − +   (1 γ ≥ )  and have cost functions 
2 (,) ( ) ii Ai B i A i B cq q q q θ =−  (with 10 θ ≥≥) while upstream firms (j = A or B) have 
symmetric cost functions, 
2
12 12 () () jj j j j cq q q q +=+ . The unique equilibrium under both 
upstream competition and monopoly involves both downstream firms being supplied 
1
82 ˆij q γ + =  by both upstream firms generating profits of  2
4
12 (4 )
ˆ () AB DDUU
γ + Π= ; which is, 
of course, greater than the fully integrated monopoly outcome of 
* 1
84 ij q γ + =  with 
1
12 42 () AB DDUU γ + Π= . Similarly, in this situation,  2
2(3 )
12 (6 2 )




++ Π=  is generated by 
an interior solution with  1
62 ˆij q θ γ ++ = . 
 
What happens when D1 and UA integrate? First, as in the no externality case, this 
eliminates certain market structures depending upon whether there has been FI or BI. 
Second, for those market structures that remain possible, equilibrium industry profits are 
unchanged for all market structures where one or more of D1, D2 and UA are not present. 
That is, a change in equilibrium profits following integration requires the presence of 
both D1 and UA, and it is only where D2 is also present that industry profits are not 
necessarily maximized under non-integration and integration alike.  
Third, the impact on equilibrium outcomes from integration is the same under 
both BI and FI. In each case, integration implies that the residual claimant on the profits 
of  D1 is the one negotiating the supply from UA to D2. Under both FI and BI, in 
negotiations over q2A, the negotiated supply quantity maximizes  12 (.) (.) (.) A c π π + − . This 
is because the residual claimant on D1’s profits negotiates with D2 over the supply from 
UA to D2. Nonetheless, negotiations that are internal to the integrated firm will still 
involve supply quantities chosen to maximize  (.) (.) ij c π − . D2 does not participate in 
                                                                                                                                                 
from UA and none from UB. As we demonstrate below, however, in contrast to the conclusion of HT, UB 
may still be paid in equilibrium. 
25 If there were externalities amongst upstream firms, this would no longer be the case.  
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those negotiations and hence, the impact on its profits is not considered. 
Fourth, there is a difference between the impact of integration in the upstream 
competition and monopoly cases. Under upstream competition, negotiations over  2B q  
will still maximize  2(.) (.) B c π −  whereas, under upstream monopoly, 
2 21 2 ˆ argmax (.) (.) (.)
B Bq B qc π π ∈+ − . The fact that competitive externalities are 
internalized in two negotiations rather than one suggests that integration will allow an 
upstream monopolist to more easily restrict output and raise prices downstream. Given 
the general nature of profit and cost functions (and potential asymmetries between firms) 
assumed thus far, it is not possible to provide a simple proof of this. 
Nonetheless, by imposing further restrictions, we can characterise the effects of 
integration on industry profits explicitly.  
Proposition 3. Let  ˆ ˆ (.) UC Π  and  ˆ ˆ (.) UM Π  denote industry profits in any perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium with passive beliefs under integration by D1 and UA, for upstream 
competition and monopoly respectively. Assume that (1) D1 and D2 are symmetric and 
indifferent as to the source of input supply; and (2) each cj has symmetric and weakly 
concave isoquants (for given total cost) in  12 (, ) jj qq .  T h e n  
(i)  12 12
ˆ ˆˆ () () U C AB AB DDUU DDUU Π= Π ; 
(ii)  If D1 and D2 sell products that are perfect substitutes, then 
12 12
ˆ ˆ () () U M AB AB DDUU DDUU Π= Π  and 
12 12 12
ˆˆ ˆˆ () () () UM A UM A A DDU DDU DDU Π= Π= Π . 
 
Proposition 3 provides a sharp characterization of the outcomes in an environment where 
upstream competition is very strong (as upstream inputs are perfectly substitutable from 
the point of view of downstream firms). The concavity of upstream cost isoquants means 
that it is cost minimizing for each upstream firm to supply a single downstream firm, 
under non-integration as well as integration.
26 In the presence of upstream competition, 
therefore, all integration does is select who will supply whom, without changing the 
actual surplus generated.
27 This leads to the interesting result that if a dedicated supply 
flow is optimal, there is no change in industry profits following integration (Result (i)). 
                                                 
26 Proposition 2 demonstrates that cost minimization is achieved in equilibrium. 
27 HT’s ex post monopolization case similarly found that there was no increase in industry profits following 
integration. This was because their case is a special case of Proposition 3 with linear isoquants.  
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When downstream firms are perfect substitutes, we can further characterize the 
results. When there is an upstream monopolist– either UA and UB are owned by the same 
manager, or UB has exited the market following breakdowns in negotiation, leaving UA 
alone in the market –integration leads to foreclosure of the non-integrated firm, D2. The 
monopoly quantity is supplied to D1, and profits are thereby maximized.
28 It is important 
to note, however, that while it appears that foreclosure occurs here – as the independent 
downstream firm receives no inputs from its integrated rival, this does not necessarily 
mean that D2 is not paid by that integrated firm; a point we discuss in more detail when 
we consider the distribution of surplus below.
29 
When D1 and D2 are not perfect substitutes, upstream firms reduce their supply to 
D2 but do not necessarily foreclose. This is precisely the monopolization effect from 
integration first identified by HT that arises because the integrated firm internalizes its 
own competitive externality when negotiating with outside parties. Industry profits are 
not perfectly maximized, in general, because the integrated firm does not take into 
account the externality it imposes on D2; something borne out in our running example. 
When it comes to integration under upstream competition, however, the impact of 
integration on overall profits is, in general, ambiguous. The main reason for this is that, 
while an upstream monopolist will necessarily take actions that realize productive 
efficiency for upstream supply, there is no similar control in upstream competition. While 
this did not matter under non-integration, integration, by creating incentives for UA to 
reduce its supply to D2, creates the opposite incentives for UB, who wants to expand 
supply to D2. If downstream firms care about the source of input supply (i.e., do not view 
outputs from UA and UB as perfect substitutes), then these changes can increase industry 
costs and lead to a reduction in profits; a possibility we demonstrate in our running 
example below.  
EXAMPLE (Continued): When  0 θ =  (downstream firms are indifferent as to the source of 
input supply), vertical integration does not change the equilibrium outcome under 
upstream competition (as this involved each upstream firm supplying a single 
downstream firm); although UA will be the sole supplier of D1 (thus, 
                                                 
28 Proposition 3 is stated more strongly that necessary, on this point: no assumptions on upstream firms are 
necessary. It is only necessary for downstream firms to be perfect substitutes. 
29 HT also find similar supply flows and industry profit outcomes as in Proposition 3. However, as will be 
discussed below, we do not find that this means that D2 is foreclosed in the traditional sense and forced to 




ˆ ˆˆ () () U C AB AB DDUU DDUU Π= Π ). For upstream monopoly, as all supply is controlled 
by the owner of D1, the impact of any supply to D2 on D1’s profits will be internalised for 
that decision. In addition, it is easy to confirm that both downstream firms will continue 
to be supplied (each from one downstream asset); although there will be a contraction of 
supply to D2 relative to the non-integrated case (thus, 
23
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+− Π= ). 
When  0 θ > , integration changes industry profits under both upstream monopoly 
and upstream competition. In each case, there is an overall reduction in output with D1 
having a higher output than D2. The following Figure 4(a) shows what happens to 
industry profits in this case and Figure 4(b) shows what happens to consumer surplus. 
Note that  12 12 12
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ () () () U M AB AB U C AB DD UU DD UU DD UU Π> Π > Π  (for θ high enough) 
while for consumer surplus non-integration provides the best outcome and integration by 
an upstream monopolist is the worst. Overall total welfare follows the consumer surplus 
ranking. Nonetheless, consumers in D1’s (D2’s) market are better (worse) off under 
integration with an upstream monopoly than the upstream competition case. 
 
Figure 4  
(θ = 1) 
(a) Industry Profits        (b) Consumer Surplus
30 














4.2  Distribution 
In solving for the equilibrium payoffs under competitive externalities, there arises 
the important issue of what SZ term ‘feasibility.’ An equilibrium is feasible if there is no 
incentive for an individual party to precipitate a breakdown in any negotiating pair at any 
stage (i.e., in any market structure that might have emerged). Under competitive 
externalities feasibility cannot be guaranteed. 
To see this, consider a situation where a single upstream firm, UA, is negotiating 
with two non-integrated downstream firms. If both negotiating pairs agree then they 
                                                 











divide up  12 ˆ () A DDU Π  with: 
()
1
12 1 2 6 ˆ 2 ( )( )( )
A UA A A v DDU DU DU =Π + Π + Π , 
() 1
1
12 1 2 6 ˆ 2( ) ( )2( ) DA A A v DDU DU DU =Π + Π − Π , 
() 2
1
12 1 2 6 ˆ 2( )2( ) ( ) DA A A v DDU DU DU =Π − Π + Π . 
 
However, suppose that UA negotiated with D1 followed by D2, then by refusing to 
negotiate with D1 and causing an eventual breakdown, UA would receive  1
2 2 () A DU Π  
from an agreement with D2 alone. If  1
21 1 2 2 ˆ ()() ( ) AA A DU DU DDU Π− Π> Π , both UA and 
D1 would prefer a breakdown to an agreement and hence, an equilibrium involving both 
downstream firms being active would not be possible. Observe that this preference would 
not occur in the absence of externalities; hence feasibility is not an issue in that case. 
Importantly, note that, in contrast to other papers on competitive externalities 
such as Hart and Tirole (1990), Rey and Tirole (1997) and Chemla (2002), we allow the 
upstream firm to exclude one downstream firm or the other. What constrains the 
incentive to exclude, however, is that after triggering a breakdown the upstream firm 
would face only a single downstream firm, with greater bargaining power as a result. The 
upstream firm trades off competitive externalities against the loss in bargaining power. 
For the remainder of this paper, we will assume that the feasibility conditions hold 
regardless of the level of integration. Nonetheless, in the appendix, we provide the full 
conditions for feasibility to hold in our model (including our running example).  
Given feasibility, we can demonstrate the following: 
Proposition 4. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs, each firm 
receives the payoffs listed in Table 2. 
 
The payoffs in Table 2 are particularly interesting: they are not classical Shapley values. 
For example, payoffs are a function of  12 ˆ (, ) AB DU DU Π , the profit earned by UA and D1 
jointly when UA supplies D1, and they face competing supply in the downstream market 
from D2, supplied by UB. In contrast, Shapley values do not allow one’s payoff to depend 
on the configuration of players that one is not cooperating with. In effect these payoffs 
are allowing for the effect of competitive externalities. Notice that when there are no 
externalities, the payoffs in Table 2 collapse to Shapley values (as in Table 1); that is,  
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profits are maximized under all market structures and, say,  12 1 ˆ (, ) () BA B DU DU DU Π= Π . 
Notice, however, that the Shapley value-type solution arises naturally in the 
upstream monopoly case. In that situation, UB can never produce independently of UA, so 
the types of partitions that arise for the upstream competition case are ruled out. Thus, 
distribution with competitive externalities does not change the payoffs of each agent; 
save for the fact that industry profits are not maximized where both downstream firms are 
present.  
4.3  Comparing Incentives for FI and BI 
In Section 3, we asked whether the acquiring firm in vertical integration would 
come from the more or less competitive vertical segment. From Table 2, we can see that 
FI will be preferred to BI, under either upstream competition or monopoly, if and only if 
12 2 ˆ () () BA B DDU DUU Π≥ Π. This corresponds to the comparison made for the no 
externalities case except that here the left hand side takes into account the fact that when 
downstream outputs are substitutes in the eyes of consumers, industry profits will be 
lower as a result of their competition. Indeed, the more substitutable are downstream 
outputs in the eyes of consumers (intensifying Cournot competition under non-
integration), the more likely it is that a downstream firm will acquire upstream assets. 
Hence, our conclusion that the acquirer will come from the more competitive vertical 
segment is strengthened when there are competitive externalities. 
4.4  Comparing Upstream Competition and Monopoly 
The central question being considered in this paper is whether it is indeed the case 
that there is more incentive for vertical integration when there is upstream monopoly 
rather than upstream competition. When there are no competitive externalities, we 
concluded that due to pure bargaining effects, the greatest potential for purely strategic 
vertical integration arose under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. 
When there are competitive externalities, vertical integration involves a 
monopolization effect and consequent welfare harm. In the special case of Proposition 3, 
this effect was stronger when there was a vertically integrated upstream monopolist rather  
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than an upstream competitor. Nonetheless, using Table 2, we can compare the incentives 
for welfare-reducing vertical integration in each case.  
Proposition 5. The increase in the joint payoff of D1 and UA from both FI and BI under 
upstream competition will exceed that achieved under upstream monopoly if and only if 
()
1
12 2 12 12 3
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ () ( )( ) ( ) B B U M AB U C AB DDU DU DDU U DDU U Π− Π ≥ Π − Π .  
 
The left hand side of the inequality in the proposition comes from the fact that the 
bargaining effect from vertical integration is stronger under upstream competition than 
monopoly. On the other hand, an upstream monopoly is able to use vertical integration 
more effectively to increase industry profits; thus, the monopolization effect weakens the 
relative incentives of an upstream competitor to vertically integrate.  
Propositions 3 and 5 demonstrate that if downstream firms sell perfectly 
substitutable products, the conventional wisdom regarding the impact of upstream 
competition on the incentive to integrate is likely (although not guaranteed) to hold. In 
that case, the left hand side of the inequality in Proposition 5 is at its lowest while the 
right hand-side is at its highest possible level; as the upstream monopolist can achieve an 
industry monopoly outcome when it integrates while under upstream competition, 
integration leaves industry profits unchanged.  
Nonetheless, as downstream products become less substitutable, it is likely that 
the reverse will be the case. Indeed, we know (from Section 3) that in the extreme – 
where downstream firms operate in separate markets – there is a greater incentive to 
integrate under upstream competition. This suggests that as the degree of downstream 
product differentiation becomes sufficiently high, the conventional wisdom will be 
overturned. For our running example we can demonstrate that this is indeed the case. 
EXAMPLE (Continued): Figure 5 illustrates the difference between the incentives for 
vertical integration under upstream competition less those under upstream monopoly. 
Note that the lower the degree of product differentiation, the lower is the relative 




Figure 5: Differences in the Payoff Increase from Integration under Upstream 
Competition and Monopoly 
 
 








    









4.5  Integration and Foreclosure 
It is worth emphasizing that the foreclosure effects of integration on non-
integrated firms differ in a subtle but important way from previous studies. An interesting 
feature of the upstream monopoly case is that, under the assumption of perfect symmetry 
and substitutability upstream and downstream, vertical integration leads to the monopoly 
output industry-wide. In that case, D2 is not supplied any inputs and hence, does not 
produce, leaving D1 to supply the monopoly quantity downstream. However, under FI, D2 
does receive a payoff of: 
( ) 2
1
12 12 () ( ) ( ) DA B i j vF I D D U U D U =Π − Π .
31 
The reason for this is that even though D2 plays no actual productive role, it does provide 
both the independent upstream firm and the integrated firm (in its internal negotiations 
under FI) with an outside option in case of a bargaining breakdown with D1.
32 Thus, 
while there is technical foreclosure in terms of the elimination of downstream 
competition, UA still cedes rents to D2 so  as t o  im p ro v e its bargaining position with 
respect to D1’s manager.
33 
                                                 
31 Note that, under BI, for this example, feasibility is not satisfied for negotiations with D2, who would 
prefer to exit the industry. 
32 It might be supposed that a lump sum payment from upstream firms to D2, without any corresponding 
input supply might be seen as strange. The solution here can be approximated, however, by some arbitrarily 
small input supply to D2. 
33 When upstream firms have constant costs (as in HT’s ‘Ex Post Monopolisation’ variant) but, say, UA’s 
costs are lower than UB’s, then UB does not supply either downstream firm under non-integration or 
integration. However, while in HT, this implies that UB receives no payoff, here that is only the case under 
1 θ =   1





5  Bandwagon Effects 
An important issue in studies of vertical integration (Chandler, 1964 and Scherer, 
1980) is whether vertical integration by one set of firms in an industry might enhance 
incentives for other firms to integrate. That is, is there a bandwagon effect associated 
with vertical integration? 
The literature is divided on this issue. Some researchers examining the possibility 
of vertical foreclosure have constructed models whereby vertical integration reduces 
incentives for further integration. For instance, Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) argue 
that initial integration is driven by competition for assets and the negative externality of 
integration on non-integrated firms, something not present for later integration choices. 
Choi and Yi (2000) similarly demonstrate that potential negative externalities motivating 
initial integration are not present for later integration as such integration may ‘re-
symmetrize’ competition and trigger a strong competitive response. In contrast, HT and 
McLaren (2000) provide models whereby initial integration raises the incentives for 
further vertical integration. In each case, vertical integration exacerbates potential ‘hold-
up’ problems faced by non-integrated firms and may drive them to integrate.  
Our approach here does not consider an asset market effect nor rely on the 
potential for vertical integration to resolve hold-up problems. In contrast, bandwagon 
effects are driven by bargaining and monopolization considerations. To see this, suppose 
that following forward or backwards integration by UA and D1, UB and D2 integrate in the 
same fashion.
34  
Under upstream monopoly, if one downstream firm is already integrated with the 
upstream firm, then further integration of the other pair will not change the bargaining 
position of any agent. Neither the flow of possible negotiation relationships nor the 
outside options of any agent change following this ownership change. Integration can 
                                                                                                                                                 
upstream monopoly. Under upstream competition, so long as UB is not too inefficient, UB receives a 
payment from D1 (or the integrated firm) so as it improve its bargaining position in the event of an internal 
breakdown. However, it always receives a payment from D2. Hence, even with FI, UB may not wish to exit 
the industry. 
34 As before, we need to make an assumption as to what would happen if negotiations broke down between 
the downstream unit of one firm and the other integrated firm. Analogous to our earlier assumption, we 
assume that in this case, no negotiations between the two firms would be possible – that is, the downstream 
unit of the other firm would not be able to purchase inputs outside their firm.  
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only serve to further monopolize the market, and then only in the case where downstream 
products are not perfect substitutes (by Proposition 3). 
Turning to the upstream competition case, the payoffs following a second merger 
are as in Table 3. From this, we can demonstrate the following:
35 
Proposition 6. Let NI, A1, B2 and CI denote the states of non-integration, integration by 
UA and D1, integration by UB and D2 and integration by both pairs, respectively. Let 
()
1
12 2 12 1 12 12 2 ˆˆˆˆ () () () () C I AB B AB A AB N I AB DD UU DD UU DD UU DD UU Λ≡ Π −Π −Π +Π . Then 
the increase in the joint payoff to UB and D2 from BI is Λ higher if it occurs after UA and 
D1 have integrated. The increase in the joint payoff to UB and D2  from FI is 
1
11 2 1 2 6
ˆ ˆˆ (( ) ( ) ) AA N I A DDU DDU Λ+ Π −Π higher if it occurs after UA and D1 have integrated. 
 
Significantly, this means that if neither the first or second merger changes overall 
industry profits, then there is no bandwagon effect; indeed, UB and D2’s incentives to 
merge are unchanged by what UA and D1 may have done. The reason is that, in these 
cases, the only impact from vertical integration comes from bargaining effects. Recall 
that integration serves to rule out possible industry configurations following negotiation 
breakdowns. Specifically, BI between UB and D2 rules out  12 () A DDU  while FI rules out 
1 () AB DU U , and these two payoffs are unaffected by a merger between UA and D1;
36 the 
increment to their joint payoff is independent of the degree of integration elsewhere. 
Thus, the return to integration does not depend on prior integration. 
When there is an impact on total profits from integration, note that FI is more 
likely to generate a bandwagon effect than BI. However, it is possible that integration 
could reduce industry profits. In this case, an initial merger may reduce the incentives for 
a second merger.  
EXAMPLE (Continued): In our running example, Figure 6(a) and (b) illustrates the size of 
the bandwagon effect both BI and FI respectively. The graphs assume that downstream 
                                                 
35 The payoffs in Table 3 are calculated using the same procedure as in Table 2 (as documented in the proof 
of Proposition 4). The remainder of the proposition comes from a direct comparison of the increase in 
payoff to UB and D2 if they merged second compared with the same increase if they merged first. These 
calculations do presume that a first merger would not be followed by a second one. If a second merger was 
expected (that is a merger by UA and D1 would occur regardless), then they would be indifferent between 
being the first or second to merge. 
36 BI of UB and D2 also rules out the coalition 
2 () A DU , something that is ruled out by FI of UA and D1; but 
this term does not enter the joint payoff of UB and D2, and therefore it does not affect the joint profitability 
of integration. (Similarly BI of either party rules out  1 () B DU ).   
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firms care about the source of inputs ( 1 θ = ). In both cases, the bandwagon effect is 
negative as product differentiation is reduced so that a first merger reduces incentives for 
a second parallel one. Note that when downstream firms are indifferent as to the source 
of input supply, by Proposition 2, the bandwagon effect is zero for BI, but for FI it is 
positive.  
 
Figure 6: Bandwagon Effect 
Payoff Increase for D2-UB as Second Merger as Opposed to First Merger 
 
(a)  BI      (b)  FI 













In both the upstream competition and monopoly cases, the primary driving force 
for a bandwagon merger is whether that merger could achieve a greater increment to 
industry profit than the initial merger. Given the usual concavity assumptions on firm 
profits, a further reduction in quantity produced in the industry following a second 
merger will not generate this additional incentive. Hence, there will often be a greater 
payoff to the initial merging parties than subsequent ones. 
6  Conclusions 
This paper has sorted out alternative claims regarding the impact of upstream 
competition on the incentives and consequences for vertical integration. While vertical 
integration that occurs when there is an upstream monopoly has the greatest potential to 
cause higher prices and lower consumer welfare, this need not translate into greater 
incentives for purely strategic vertical integration. Specifically, those incentives may be 
higher when there is upstream competition (especially if downstream competition is not 
too intense) and may be higher for backward integration (from the competitive into the 
monopolistic segment) than for forward integration (akin to the more conventional 
γ  γ  
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picture of an acquiring monopolistic firm). 
In terms of competition and anti-trust analysis, our results support the notion that 
proposed vertical mergers involving a monopoly bottleneck are of greater concern than 
where there is upstream competition. Nonetheless, in terms of policies designed to 
restructure industries and encourage upstream competition (such as those that have 
occurred in cable television and telecommunications), the potential gains associated with 
these moves may be mitigated as it could encourage greater strategic vertical integration.  
Nonetheless, while our model has synthesized and generalized existing models in 
the strategic vertical integration literature – as well as providing a framework linking 
these to models in the property rights literature – there are many possible extensions. In 
particular, moving beyond the simple 2 by 2 case would be useful. This could be by 
expanding the number of upstream and downstream assets as well as deepening the 
vertical chain of production. This would allow a mapping between our work and the work 
of Hendricks and McAfee (2000) who provide a means of linking concentration measures 
and integration in vertical segments with the potential for anticompetitive harm from a 
merger. Their work is based on a mechanism design approach to vertical relations 
whereas ours uses a non-cooperative bargaining model. This would also provide a means 
of dealing more carefully with the impact of vertical integration on entry.  
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Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions 
Proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 4: 
Take a given sequence of negotiations. The first negotiating pair, bargaining in an 
alternating offer format, offer a price and a quantity to each other with an exogenous risk 
of breakdown following any non-accepted offer. This is the format of Binmore, 
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) and they demonstrate that the unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium of this bargaining game is the Nash bargaining solution. For example, 
between Di and Uj, the bargaining solution will be the solution to the following problem: 
  () ( ) ,1 2 1 2 max ( , , , ) ( , )
ij ij qp i i A i B i A i B i A i B i j j j j j j j i qqq q p p p p cqq π −− − −− Φ +− − Φ  
Under passive beliefs, the outcomes of any agreement in this bargaining game will not 
impact on the negotiating parties expectations of agreements that will be reached in any 
subsequent negotiation (that is, pij and qij are taken as given for any negotiation not 
involves both Di and Uj). Hence, price in each negotiating pair will be determined by 




(,) (,, , )
12 1 2
(,) (,, , )
(,, , ) (, )
 (substituting equations (2) to (5) below)
jjj ii A i B i A i B
ij ij
jjj ii A i B i A i B
ij ij
cqq qqq q
ii Ai B i A i B i A i B i j j j j j j j i q q
cqq qqq q
qq










−−− Φ = +− − Φ
⇒=
 
Thus, quantity will be chosen to maximize the joint profits of each negotiating pair. That 
is, 
*
12 argmax ( , , , ) ( , )
ij ij q i iA iB iA iB j j j qq q q q c q q π −− ∈− . If there are no competitive 
externalities and quantities can be renegotiated in any breakdown subgame, under passive 
beliefs, these are the only terms in industry profits containing qij; hence, if all negotiating 
pairs choose their respective quantities to maximize joint profits, by our concavity 
assumptions, industry profits will be maximized. This establishes efficiency for the no 
externality case (Proposition 1). 
When there are competitive externalities, each pair chooses a quantity that 
maximizes joint profits taking the quantities chosen in other pairs as given. However, 
these quantities are chosen in a manner that equates marginal downstream profit to 
marginal upstream cost. Note that if instead downstream firms chose their quantities 











∂ = , then this will yield the same outcome as in each negotiation 
(establishing Proposition 2). 
For distribution, given passive beliefs, in the initial subgame, there are four 
bargaining pairs, the pricing outcomes of which are described by the following equations.  
  11 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 (,, , ) (, ) AB AB A B A A A AA A A qqqq p p p p c qq π −−− Φ =+− − Φ %% %%  (2)  
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  11 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 (,, , ) (, ) AB AB A B B B B BB B B qqqq p p p p c qq π −−− Φ =+− − Φ %% %%  (3) 
  2 1122 2 2 2 1 2 12 2 (,, , ) (, ) A B A B AB AAA A A A A qqqq p p p p c qq π −−− Φ =+− − Φ %% %%  (4) 
  2 1122 2 2 2 1 2 12 2 (,, , ) (, ) AB AB A B B B B BB B B qqqq p p p p c qq π −−− Φ =+− − Φ %% %%  (5) 
where  ij Φ  and  ji Φ  represent the payoffs Di and Uj expect to receive in the renegotiation 
subgame triggered by a breakdown in their negotiations. Solving these equations 
recursively, including the payoffs of each renegotiation subgame, allows us to derive the 
equilibrium payoffs of each firm as in Table 2 (Proposition 4). 
Under integration, the equations change. For example, for FI, the resulting (Nash) 
bargaining equations become: 
  111 1 1 2 2 1 12 1 2 1 (,, , ) (, ) AA A B A B A BA A A A A tq q q q t p p c q q π −Φ = − − + − −Φ %% %%  (6) 
  1 1122 1 1 2 12 1 2 12 (,, , ) (, ) (, ) A B A BA BA A A A A BBB B B B B A qqqq t p p c qq p p c qq π −− + − − Φ= + − − Φ % %% %% (7) 
  2 1122 2 2 2 1 1122 1 1 2 12 2 (,, , ) (,, , ) (, ) AB AB A B A AB AB A B A AA A A qqqq p p qqqq t p p c qq π π −−− Φ = − −+− − Φ % %% %% (8) 
  2 1122 2 2 2 1 2 12 2 (,, , ) (, ) AB AB A B B B B BB B B qqqq p p p p c qq π −−− Φ =+− − Φ %% %%  (9) 
Notice that there is a change in negotiating pairs relative to the non-integrated case. UA 
negotiates a supply agreement with UB for the supply of inputs to D1. This is because the 
residual control rights of the downstream asset have been transferred to UA. Again, 
solving these equations recursively, including the payoffs of each renegotiation subgame, 
allows us to derive the equilibrium payoffs of each firm as in Table 2 (Proposition 4).  
Proof of Proposition 3 
Suppose that  11 22 (,, , ) ( , ) ( ) ii Ai B i A i B A B A B i A i B qqq q P q qq q q q π −− = ++ + . Then, under 
both upstream monopoly and competition, with non-integration, equilibrium quantities 
are determined by: 
 




AA B qq qq q P
∂ ∂
∂∂ ++≤  (10) 
 




BA B qq qq q P
∂ ∂
∂∂ ++≤  (11) 
 




AA B qq qq q P
∂ ∂
∂∂ ++≤  (12) 
 




BA B qq qq q P
∂ ∂
∂∂ ++≤  (13) 
Suppose that each downstream firm was supplied positive input quantities from each 
upstream firm and each of the above conditions held with equality. Then,  11 AB qq +  must 
equal  22 AB qq + . Note that if, say, both  1A q  and  1B q  are strictly positive, both (10) and 







∂∂ = . This can only be true if isoquants are 
linear (in which case any combination of  1A q  and  1B q  satisfying  11 AB qq +  is an 







∂∂ ≠  implying that either one of 
(10) and (11) hold with equality with the other being a strict inequality. Applying the 
same logic to D2’s inputs, an equilibrium outcome exists that involves  21 0 AB qq ==  and 
12 AB qq =  at their Cournot equilibrium quantities with (10) and (13) holding with equality  
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∂∂ = ).  
 
Under upstream monopoly (ii), with vertical integration, equilibrium quantities 
are determined by: 
 




AA B qq qq q P
∂ ∂
∂∂ ++≤  (14) 
 




BA B qq qq q P
∂ ∂
∂∂ ++≤  (15) 
 




AA B A B qq q qqqq P
∂ ∂
∂∂ +++ + ≤  (16) 
 




BA B A B qq q qqqq P
∂ ∂
∂∂ +++ + ≤ (17) 






∂ < , (16) and (17) are only satisfied if 
22 0 AB qq +=  while (14) and (15) cannot hold if  22 0 AB qq + >  and (16) and (17) hold. As 
22 0 AB qq += , given the perfect substitutes assumption, industry profits are maximized 
under upstream monopoly. Moreover when  12 0 BB qq + = , the only way (14) and (16) can 
simultaneously hold is if  2 0 A q = . Hence,  12 12
ˆ ˆ () () AB AB DDUU DDUU Π= Π. The case for 
12 12
ˆ ˆ () () AA DDU DDU Π= Π follows analogously. 
Under upstream competition (i), (17) is still as in (13) In this case, the only way 
all four inequalities can be satisfied is if  12 0 BA qq = = ; in which case, given the 
homogeneity of upstream costs, equilibrium downstream outputs are at their Cournot 
levels and so total industry profits remains the same as under non-integration. Note that 
the perfect substitutes assumption is not required in this case. 
Appendix B: Feasibility Conditions 
In this appendix, we provide explicitly, the conditions for our solution in Table 2 
to be feasible. However, we do this for the special case where both upstream and both 
downstream firms are symmetric. While this simplifies notation, it is not an innocuous 
assumption. Indeed, it is precisely where one firm is far more productive than another 
that feasibility may breakdown. Thus, our purpose here is to give a feel for the conditions 
rather than a comprehensive treatment. 
 
For the symmetric case, under non-integration, feasibility requires the following 
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where  1 ˆ
− Π  is equilibrium industry profits where one downstream-upstream pair cannot 
trade with one another. Natural sufficient conditions for these to be satisfied are that 
12 1 12 12 ˆˆ ˆ () () m a x { ( ) , ( ) , 2 ( , ) } AB AB j iAB i j i j DDUU DDUU DDU DUU DU D U − −− Π≥ Π ≥ Π Π Π . 
Notice that these collapse to  1
12 2 ˆ () ( ) ji j DDU DU Π≥ Π  if D1 and D2 produce final goods 
that are perfect substitutes and UA and UB are perfectly substitutable for one another (say 
having identical constant cost functions) as 
12 1 12 12 ˆˆ ˆ () () ( ) 2 ( , ) AB AB i i j i j DDUU DDUU DDU DU D U −− − Π= Π = Π = Π , and 
() ( ) iAB ij DU U DU Π= Π . With linear demand (P = 1 – Q) and constant costs (c<1), this 
condition is equivalent to: 
2 7
72(1 ) 0 c −> . Thus, the feasibility condition is satisfied. 
 
When integration occurs, the feasibility conditions will be contingent upon 
whether there is forward or backwards integration. In this case, however, we can gather 
further information from the fact that integration is possible; namely, that the acquired 
firm still operates and hence, their payoffs must be feasible. So if UA took over D1, then 
an agreement with D1 will be presumed to be feasible. This means that it must be the case 
that:  12 12
ˆˆ ˆˆ () ( ) 2 ( ) AB i iAB DDUU DDU DUU Π+ Π ≥ Π . Under symmetry, in addition to 
conditions under non-integration, the following conditions are required for feasibility: 
21 2 1 2
ˆˆ ˆˆ 3( ) ( ) 3 ( ) () 0 BA B ii A B i j DDUU DDU DUU DU − Π+ Π − Π + Π ≥  
{ } 11 2 1 2 1 2
ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 3 ( ) ( ) m a x 3( ) ( ) , 3( ) ( ) BA B i j i A B i i i A B DDU U DU DU U DDU DDU DU U − Π+ Π ≥ Π − Π Π − Π
21 2 1 2
ˆˆ ˆˆ () ( ) ( ) 0 AA B i i j DDUU DDU DU − Π− Π + Π ≥  
11 2
12 1 2 12 12
21 2
ˆ ˆ 3( ) ,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ 3 ( )( )( ) m a x 3 ( )( ) ,
ˆ ˆ 3( ) 2 ()
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AB AB i j A AB i
BA B i j
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For the case the perfect substitutes upstream and downstream, these reduce to: 
1
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Figure 2: Upstream Competition 
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Figure 3: Upstream Monopoly 
Patterns of Negotiation 
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Table 1: Payoffs in No Externality Case 
(where (x,y) = (1,1) for NI, (0,1) for FI and (1,0) for BI) 
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Table 2: Payoffs in Competitive Externality Case 
(where (x,y) = (1,1) for NI, (0,1) for FI and (1,0) for BI) 
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Table 3: Payoffs from Second Merger 
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